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Abstract Today’s international organizations are characterized by a fundamental
deficit in democracy. We therefore propose institutional measures to increase the
direct participation possibilities of the citizens in international organizations. In
order to reduce the number of citizens involved in decision-making to a
manageable size, a representative sample of trustees is selected using a random
mechanism. The trustees are given the right to launch initiatives and to vote in
referendums on issues related to an international organization’s constitution. They
can also recall executives when they are dissatisfied with their behavior. No
specific changes to the organization of these entities, especially their executive
function, are proposed. Rather, the executives of international organizations must
obey the constitutional changes adopted by the trustees. The proposal gives
international organizations democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the executives are
subjected to the control of the citizens of the member states, which induces better
responsiveness to the preferences of the people, as well as higher organizational
efficiency.
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1. Introduction
International organizations play an important role in today’s world. It is difficult to
imagine an international system without these institutions. This is all the more so as
there is no world government.
International organizations form an indispensable part of global governance.
They are necessary in providing global and international public services.1 They
certainly fulfill a need, reflected in the rapid growth since the end of the Second
World War in the number of different organizations, the number of employees and
the budgets at their disposal.2 The services provided refer to all three classical
functions of government: international organizations are active in the allocation of
resources in the form of global or international public goods and services, the
redistribution of income and the stabilization of the global economy.
International organizations, however, lack a democratic citizenry. While there is
the idea of a global civil society, there is no blossoming citizenry so far in
international governance.3 Therefore, international organizations cannot, in general,
be seen to consist of democratic institutions based on the consent and will of the
citizens. This is in contrast to a favorable development at the national level. The
number of national governments that may be considered to be democratic, or nearly
democratic, has increased considerably in the last century (Freedom House, 1999).
Compared to the development at a national level, international organizations are
lagging behind. There is a Bdemocracy deficit,’’ and Bdemocratic legitimacy’’ is either
inadequate, or even lacking altogether. Decision-making in international organ-
izations is far removed from the citizens’ preferences. There is, at best, an indirect
and weak link, via democratically elected national parliaments and governments. In
most cases, the delegates are sent by the member countries to particular
international organizations and are determined by the national bureaucracies. Only
in the case of international organizations, deemed particularly important by the
government, are the delegates determined by a political rather than a bureaucratic
process. The decision-making processes in the international organizations them-
selves are largely shaped by issues to do with bureaucracy or power, again far
removed from democratic influences.
The lack of democratic decision-making in international organizations, however,
has a negative effect on the provision of public goods and services. Such
organizations have often been observed, and accused of being dominated by the
narrow self-interest of their employees. They are taken to be open to corruption,
and to disregard the interests of both the taxpayers financing these activities and the
persons receiving them. The activities are undertaken in an inefficient and wasteful
way. As a result, the allocative, redistributive and stabilizing functions undertaken
by international organizations leave much to be desired.4
1 Insightful reviews on multinational and global public policy in international organizations are,
e.g., Hewson and Sinclair (1999), Nye and Donahue (2001), Kahler and Lake (2003), Kaul et al.
(2003), Keohane and Nye (2000).
2 On the growth of international organizations according to size and number, see, e.g., The Union of
International Associations (2004) and Vaubel, Dreher, and Soylu (2003).
3 Concepts of a global civil society are, e.g., developed in Kaldor (2003) and Keane (2003). They are
discussed as a response to the need of new democratic ways of living in a globalized world.
4 For a review of the pathologies of international organizations, see, e.g., Barnett and Finnemore
(1999).
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However, many such accusations against international organizations are unfair
because they compare the actual way they function with an ideal situation in which
they would perform in a perfect way. If this standard is applied, all institutions must
be considered to work badly. The same charges can be made against national
governments, non-governmental organizations, and even private corporations (see
the recent flurry of excessive managerial compensation, distorted bookkeeping and
open fraud, e.g., Frey and Osterloh, 2005). A more appropriate approach must
compare the behavior of international organizations to similar existing institutions,
such as national governments. International organizations then appear in a more
favorable light.
However, the fundamental weakness of today’s international organizations—the
democracy deficit—remains. It involves a lack of responsiveness to the preferences
of the citizens, both with regard to the provision of outcomes and the application of
decision-making processes. Therefore, to strengthen citizens’ participation rights in
international organizations, we see it as a value in itself, as well as a means for
reducing inefficiency (broadly conceived). The argument thus combines procedural
and outcome considerations.5
Instead of providing a positive analysis of international organizations (a task
which has been attempted in Frey, 1984, chapter 8; 1997d; Frey and Gygi, 1991;
Vaubel and Willett, 1991), this paper puts forward a proposal for increasing the
direct participation possibilities of the citizens of an international organization’s
member countries. Thereby, we base our arguments on the Faverage citizen_ with
some motivation to participate in politics and express his or her political views
(rather than on the construct of a narrowly self-interested political ignorant).
We propose that citizens are given the right to start initiatives, to vote in
referendums, and to recall executives. As, at least at the present time, it is impossible
to have all citizens participate in such referendums, we propose using a random
mechanism in order to select those citizens who could then exercise these direct
democratic rights (they will be referred to as Btrustees’’).6 This idea may seem to be
rather unorthodox, and may perhaps even appear to be Bunrealistic.’’ In particular,
there is a vast range of types of international governance organizations with large
differences in their structures. For example, there are Fcharter_ based bodies like the
IMF or UNESO that work quite differently than a Fcontract_ based body like the
WTO. We do not aim at providing a proposal adequate to all of these different
organizational forms but try to raise arguments that could be linked to most of
them. We readily admit that we do not expect our proposal to be adopted rapidly
5 The procedural aspect of democratic political decision-making is emphasised in research on
participatory democracy (see, e.g., Barber, 1984; Mansbridge, 1983; Pateman, 1970 and Thompson,
1970). An introduction to the concept of procedural utility is provided in Frey, Benz, and Stutzer
(2004). The argument of (in)efficient outcomes is based on reasoning developed in Public Choice or
New Political Economy (see e.g. Mueller, 1997, 2003; Frey, 1978), and more specifically on
Constitutional Economics (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Frey, 1983; Brennan and Buchanan, 1985;
Mueller, 1996; Cooter, 2000) and on New Institutional Economics (North, 1990; Furubotn and
Richter, 1997).
6 We thus propose an approach that is rather different from the one pursued, e.g., in the work of
Held (1997) and Archibugi, Balduini, and Donati (2000). They develop a notion of cosmopolitan
democracy that builds on current principles of representative parliamentary government at the
global level.
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and to be widespread. But we would like to draw the attention of a skeptical reader
to three aspects:
1. Our proposal should be considered in the light of the current problems
international organizations face. For instance, the United Nations finds it
extremely hard, if not impossible, to make even minor reforms (e.g., with
respect to the composition of the Security Council);
2. Our proposal could serve as a general indication of the direction that a useful
reform might go in; and
3. It does not appear to be totally out of the question that newly founded
international organizations might adopt a constitution giving citizens more rights.
Due to strongly entrenched interests, it seems less likely that already established
international organizations would be able and willing to grant citizens more
power in the near future, but it cannot be excluded long term.
Section 1 discusses the role of citizens and trustees proposed in the decision-
making process of international organizations. In particular, the process of randomly
selecting trustees from the pool of citizens of the member states will be analyzed. The
following Section 2 sketches the overall outline of a more democratic international
organization. Section 3 considers the expected consequences of introducing such
extended participation rights by the citizens. Section 4 concludes.
2. Citizens in International Organizations: The Random Selection of Trustees
Existing international organizations are often anything but democratic. They are to
a large extent run by diplomats and politicians who are appointed in what is often an
obscure way. They are far from being democratically legitimized. Public officials,
who were brought in from national bureaucracies, or who have risen within the
ranks of the organization itself, also have a large say. The deliberations preceding
decisions (with only a few exceptions) remain with this elite, and are concealed from
the public. These conditions, and others, have been strongly criticized by an insider,
who acted as chief economist and vice-president of the World Bank (Stiglitz, 2002).
Moreover, many international organizations are plagued by huge inefficiencies.7
One of the main purposes of the institutional design must therefore be to make the
international organizations more democratic and to subject them to outside control
by persons who are not a part of the elite running these institutions.
We propose to overcome the insufficient democratic foundation and efficiency of
international organizations by empowering the citizens of the member states to have
a say in the decisions made. In order to deal with the frequently considerable
number of citizens involved, the voting body is reduced to a size allowing voting to
proceed in a manageable manner. This is achieved by selecting a restricted number
of persons via a random mechanism, giving each citizen of a member country the
same chance of being chosen. The random choice of a subset of the citizenry allows
for taking advantage of citizen participation while keeping transaction costs low. In
7 This is, or was, e.g., the case for many institutions of the United Nations, such as the UNESCO.
The UN financial institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank) are less inefficient,
mainly because the voting rights are distributed according to the financial commitments. This
provides the main nations financing these organizations with an incentive to prevent large-scale
inefficiency (Frey, 1984; Frey and Gygi, 1990).
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particular, these are the administrative costs of contacting people and sending them
information material by regular mail. In order to reflect the equality of member
countries in international organizations, the same number of citizens is selected
from each nation, for example 10,000.
We recommend a number that is higher than necessary to achieve a statistically
representative sample. With more trustees, it is more difficult for any interest group
to buy them or for any government to put pressure on them. A higher number of
trustees allows stratified random sampling so that small minorities are represented
even with more than one trustee.8
We are aware that weighting according to the size and/or importance of a nation
is a possibility. The number of trustees could, for example, be proportional to the
size of the population or financial contributions. Our proposal, however, is based on
current practice in many international organizations to give equal weight to each
member country. It thus protects small countries, which would lose any influence in
formal decisions if the size of the population would be the basis for selecting
trustees. The proposal, however, is not just giving in to the status quo by simply
taking over the distribution of power. Rather, giving equal weight to small countries
counteracts their incentive to free ride, which is stronger than for the large countries
that are decisive for the provision of international public goods.
The appointment is for several years. We propose 5 years in order not to coincide
with most national legislative periods.9 The citizens selected in this way will now be
referred to as Btrustees’’ in order to indicate that they carry a special responsibility,
and that they have an incentive to be trusted by the community of citizens as a
whole. The trustees are identified, so that they can be addressed both by individuals
and groups interested in having the particular international organization pursue a
certain policy. Selected citizens get involved in private and public discourse and they
can be asked about their opinion. The prestige from being a trustee is also enhanced
when they are (publicly) known. If the names of trustees are made public, it is also
less possible for the national governments to exert pressure. As the national
administrations apply the random selection mechanism, the identity of the
representatives cannot be hidden from the national governments.
Trustees may either vote by using the postal system or e-mail.10 The more e-
voting is introduced and becomes the standard way to participate politically, the
larger the percentage of citizens selected as trustees can be. However, when
choosing the number of trustees, it must be taken into account that citizens are not
overburdened with too many mandates as trustees (for different organizations).
Trustees are given the right to vote on issues of content, as is the case in semi-
direct democracies. The institutions existing in the governing bodies of the
8 With repetition of pure random sampling, on average, the same number of trustees is selected from
minorities as with stratified sampling. However, the actual number of minority representatives in
each turn varies in the former case; what might reduce the acceptance of the mechanism in these
groups.
9 There is, of course, a trade-off here. The shorter the term in office, the larger the number of
preferences represented via random selection. But this has the disadvantage that the selected
citizens are less capable of getting informed about the activities of the particular international
organization. The more important experience and factual knowledge are, the longer the term should
be.
10 It is important to note that e-mail is not yet available to most of the world_s population.
Moreover, many security issues are not solved with e-voting either.
Rev Int Org (2006) 1: 27–43 31
Springer
respective international organizations remain in force. It should be emphasized that
there is still a governing body for making day-to-day decisions and executing
policies. The major difference to the international organizations existing today is
that the vote by the trustees would be binding for the executive bodies: they must
undertake what the trustees have decided according to the international organ-
ization’s constitution or charter.
By definition, the random mechanism assigns an equal probability to each citizen
of a country being chosen as a trustee. The random selection may, in practice, be
undertaken by using any appropriate mechanical system (such as lots) or computer
programs. The underlying population from which the trustees are selected should be
taken from the voting registers of the countries that are members of the particular
international organization, assuming that these countries are (at least formally)
democracies. Where the voting register and/or the selection mechanism is doubtful,
the international organization might be given the constitutional right to send
observers in order to guarantee that appropriate procedures are applied.
The random mechanism has rarely been used in the public realm.11 But there are
several examples where random procedures have been used:
First, they can be used as a strategy in decision-making. An important example is
conscription for military service. In the 1970s, the U.S. government, for instance,
used a lottery based on birthdays to determine which men were drafted into the
army in order to fight in Vietnam. Draft lotteries were also used during World Wars
I and II, both in the United States and in several European countries. Every eligible
man should have an equal probability of being chosen.
Second, random mechanisms can be used as a strategy to choose decision makers.
The best-known example today is the choice of persons to form a jury in serious
criminal cases, such as murder, but sometimes also in civil cases. Criminal juries are
of major importance in Anglo-Saxon countries, but also exist on the European
continent, especially in Scandinavia. While professional judges are certainly more
knowledgeable, the major reason to randomly select jurors is in order that justice be
perceived as fair. Persons drawn by chance from the whole population are seen to
be, on average, more honest than some professional judges, and to reflect more
closely the moral standards of the population. Moreover, fairness may lie in being
heard and judged by ordinary people drawn from the whole population.12
Third, there have been important cases in the past in which random selection has
been used. Classical democracy in Athens in the fifth and fourth century B.C.E.,
which is still a model for today, used random selection as a central feature (see e.g.,
Manin, 1997; Hansen, 1991; Engelstad, 1989). The Assembly, which every one of the
between 30,000 and 60,000 citizens could attend, took the most important decisions.
Its business was prepared by the Council of 500 members, composed of 10 groups of
50 members each. Each group was chosen by lot from one of the ten tribes of
Athens. Each group took a turn as the Committee (prytany), and the order in which
this was done was determined by lot. The persons presiding over the Assembly, the
Council and the Committee were chosen by lot on the day they met. In addition,
most public officials were chosen randomly. The only exception was when
11 Extensive discussions of the use of the random mechanism in politics are provided by Elster
(1989, chapter II) and Carson and Martin (1999). They refer to much additional literature.
12 In reality, neither the draft nor juries are chosen in a perfectly random way. See Carson and
Martin (1999: 20–21, 26–30), Elster (1989: 93–103).
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competence was considered fundamental for a particular office, such as the military
officers and financial officials who were elected. Moreover, not all citizens could
become randomly selected officials. They had, for instance, to be at least thirty years
old. They were also subject to an assessment when selected, as well as at the end of
their respective terms of office.
It is likely that other ancient Greek city-states used similar random mechanisms
to select their politicians and public officials, but little is known about the respective
rules. But random choice is well documented for medieval Italian city-states. It
played a large role, particularly in Florence between 1328 and 1530, where the six to
12 members of the city government (whose terms were quite short, sometimes being
only of two months’ duration) were chosen by lot from the volunteers running for
office. Their ability to do the job was scrutinized by a group of aristocrats and
citizens. The latter were again selected by lot. Random mechanisms were also
extensively used in other Italian city-states, such as Bologna, Parma and Vicenza, as
well as in Barcelona. It was used in Venice until the city’s independence was
terminated by Napoleon in 1797. The selection process for the doge was very
complex and, at each stage, involved random elements (see Knag, 1998). First, 30
members of the Great Council, composed of several hundred members, were
selected randomly and then reduced to nine by another draw. These persons elected
a new group of 40, which in turn were reduced to 12 by yet another draw. These 12
persons in turn elected a new group of 25, which was again reduced by a random
mechanism to nine. This was repeated several times. Only then did a group of 41,
none of whom could have been chosen previously, elect the doge. In the 1900s in
San Marino, a similar procedure was used to select the state’s two governors from
the 60-member council (Carson and Martin, 1999: 33).
In the scholarly literature, many suggestions have been made to use random
mechanisms in social decision-making because of its attractive features. It suffices to
refer to some examples directly relevant for the proposal advanced here.
Random dictator. Out of the total electorate, one person is chosen by lot to act as a
dictator for a specified period of time. This proposal seems to be rather awkward,
but there are some good arguments in its favor (Elster, 1989: 86–91). Random
election is the only system that does not encourage people to misrepresent their
preferences, in particular by appearing to be more honest and less egoistic than they
in fact are. In contrast, all elections provide an incentive to the contenders to
present a too favorable image of themselves to the voters. Another advantage is that
the institution of a random dictator selects an Bordinary,’’ representative, member of
the citizenry, and thus prevents professional politicians with their special interests
taking over. These advantages are also directly relevant for the random selection of
citizens in charge of international organizations.
The institution of a random dictator also has some obvious disadvantages. The
persons chosen as temporal dictators have no opportunity to learn from experience.
The public bureaucracy, with its long and extensive experience, tends to accumulate
considerable power and, when taken to the extreme, can dominate the citizens selected.
In contrast to selection by lot, regular elections and re-elections have the advantage of
making the incumbents accountable to the voters. As was already taken into account in
the classical Athenian democracy, random selection is inefficient in those areas of
governance where the office holders have to exhibit special competence.
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Probability Voting. Random selection can be combined with voting on issues. In the
simple case of there being two alternatives, a vote is taken and the winner is then
determined by using a random mechanism, whereby alternatives are attributed
probabilities according to the percentage of votes they received. If alternative A
receives 70% of the votes (and seven red balls), and B 30% (and three blue balls), then
alternative A is chosen if e.g., a random draw from a receptacle with the ten balls
results in the selection of a red ball. If a blue ball is randomly drawn, alternative B is
the winner (Frey, 1969; Intriligator, 1973).
Voting by Veto. In this decision-making system (Mueller, 1978), each person puts
forward one alternative, and there is also the status quo alternative. In each round of
voting, one voter can veto one of the alternatives. The sequence in which the voters
can act in this way is determined by lot. Whichever alternative remains, i.e., is not
vetoed by anyone, is the winner.
Random Selection in a Representative Democracy. From the voting populace, a
random sample is chosen to form a national legislature (Mueller, Tollison, and
Willett, 1972). Selection is through stratiﬁed sampling in order to ensure the
representation of people with certain characteristics, as well as to prevent the
overrepresentation of minority preferences. There is no stratiﬁed geographic
sampling, as one goal of the proposal is to overcome pork barrel activities.
As is true for all social decision-making mechanisms, random selection has its
strengths and weaknesses. Only the most important ones are mentioned here (for a
fuller discussion see Carson and Martin, 1999: 34–38; Elster, 1989: 103–122).
Major advantages are:
– A random selection is fair in the sense that every person gets an equal chance of
being selected.13 If the random mechanism is correctly applied, no other
consideration, such as income, status or political connections plays any role.
– The selection is totally representative as, after a number of draws, the persons
chosen exactly reflect the underlying population of voters. No particular gender,
race, religion or any other group is favored.
– Decisions by lot are easy to undertake and are universally applicable. A common
method of deciding between two issues is to toss a coin. When there are more
issues involved, balls are put into an urn, and then one or more balls are selected
either mechanically or by a person (these procedures are well known from
lotteries, and are regularly shown on TV).
There are also important actual or presumed disadvantages:
– The random method seems to lack Brationality,’’ in the sense that no reason for a
particular choice is given. But individuals seem to have an innate need to attribute
a reason to a certain choice. Having no reason for a selection leaves a feeling of
13 Of course, this only holds for ballots with equal probabilities, which are the general rule. But it is
quite possible to assign a person, or group of persons, more weight, e.g., they can be given two times
or three times as much weight. But the argument continues in the sense that no other considerations
enter into the matter.
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dissatisfaction. The interpretation of random mechanisms being aimless, haphaz-
ard and indifferent derives from this.
– The persons chosen tend to have a reduced obligation to take seriously the task
for which they are chosen. Exactly because they are chosen indiscriminately,
they can hardly pride themselves on having been selected because of their
intelligence, dedication, efficiency or knowledge. As a result, the intrinsic
motivation to perform well might be reduced (this is a kind of Bcrowding-out
effect,’’ see Frey, 1997b).
While this argument rings true, it is of lesser importance in reality than one
might expect. Even purely randomly selected persons, after a short time, tend to
attribute positive features to themselves, once they have been selected. At least,
to some extent, they believe that their choice has been Bgod_s will’’ (an aspect
crucial in Athenian democracy, see Elster, 1989: 50–52) or, in a secularized
society, that it at least has some unknown deeper meaning behind it.
These advantages and disadvantages should not be considered in isolation. They
need to be compared to the advantages and disadvantages any other social decision
making system has (following a comparative institutional analysis). This paper
argues that the advantages of random selection are particularly strong for the
selection of representative citizens to overview international organizations. While
the disadvantages certainly cannot be dismissed, they are in this particular
application reckoned to be of minor importance compared to the disadvantages of
using other social decision-making mechanisms.
3. Direct Democratic Participation in International Organizations
The trustees selected by lot can exercise their rights and determine the international
organization_s policies in two different ways:
(1) They can initiate votes on issues of content (initiatives) or on people (recall).
Both a successfully launched initiative and a recall force the managers of the
international organization concerned to hold a vote among all the citizens
selected.
An initiative enables trustees to put an issue on the political agenda of an
international organization. The demands are directed explicitly against the
political establishment represented in the international organization’s assembly
or executive.
Recall allows for the dismissal of whichever executives of the international or-
ganization the trustees deem unreliable, ineffective, corrupt, or unwilling to un-
dertake the policies described by the international organization’s constitution.
Whether such votes are frequent or rare is to a large extent determined by
the signature requirement. The signature requirement can be defined as a total
minimal number across nations. However, it can also include minimal numbers
of signatures within a percentage of countries, or restrictions for the maximum
duration of time between the point of time an initiative/recall is announced
and the point of time the signatures are deposited.14
14 Alternatively, signing an initiative or recall can be granted to every citizen, whether selected or
not. In this case, signature requirements should be substantially increased.
Rev Int Org (2006) 1: 27–43 35
Springer
We propose a signature requirement of 10 percent of the total number of
trustees. Moreover, in order to give a counterweight to the possible dominance
of a single country or a group of countries, a minimum percentage of member
countries must reach this signature requirement (we propose one quarter of the
member countries). This double signature requirement prevents an initiative
from being undertaken by a few countries, or even one country, in isolation.
(2) They can vote in a mandatory referendum applicable to major issues, such as
changes in the ground rules (the constitution) of the international organization.
Mandatory referendums thus serve a controlling function because, if successful,
they overrule the decisions taken by the executive and the legislative bodies. We
propose that changes in the constitution require the trustees’ approval.
For an initiative or recall to be successful, or a constitution to be amended by a
referendum, a majority of trustees has to approve the proposals. In order for
constitutional changes to be adopted, some qualified majority may be required, and
we propose a simple double majority: More than half of all the trustees exercising
their voting right must vote for the change. In addition, more than half of the
member countries must approve the proposal.
The content of initiatives is not restricted. However, proposals are made for
changes in the constitution of an international organization. Recall of the
management of international organizations can be applied to politicians and public
officials. Assigning a signature quorum faces a trade-off. The lower the quorum is, the
larger the uncertainty among the managers, inducing them to take a short-term view.
The higher the quorum is, the stronger is the position of the managers. The less
discretionary room the managers have, the less threatening is such management
power to the interests of the citizens in the member states. In some cases, the tasks of
the international organizations are so precisely defined that the managers are severely
restricted. If that happens, the quorum for recall can well be high. In other cases, the
managers are, to a large extent, able to determine the organization_s activities by
themselves, in which case a stricter restriction on the threat of recall is desirable.
Instruments of direct democracy have a long tradition and have been applied
around the world.15 They refine the form of democracy based on representation and
indirect political participation via elections. Direct democracy (or, more precisely,
semi-direct democracy) does not substitute for parliament, government, courts and
all the other features of representative democracies. Likewise, it does not substitute
for the executive or the assembly of an international organization. Instead, it
transfers the final rights for determining issues to the citizens or trustees. There is
extensive knowledge in political science, law and economics about the workings of
direct democracy at the state and federal level.16 Some of the consequences to be
expected from our proposal are based on this research and are discussed in the
following section.
15 See e.g., Magleby (1984), Cronin (1989), Butler and Ranney (1994), Frey (1994), Kirchgaessner,
Feld, and Savioz (1999). In particular, there is widespread experience with forms of referendums on
all continents and in many countries that do not count as established democracies today. See the
database supported by the Research and Documentation Center on Direct Democracy http://
c2d.unige.ch/) at the University of Geneva. We are aware that the votes undertaken often were not
binding and were used as plebiscites. However, based on these experiences, people are expected to
receive direct political participation not as outlandish and not as imposed by some western ideology.
16 For reviews of the literature, see e.g., Bowler and Donovan (1998), Frey and Stutzer (2006),
Gerber and Hug (2001), Kirchgaessner et al. (1999) and Matsusaka (2004).
36 Rev Int Org (2006) 1: 27–43
Springer
4. Expected Consequences
4.1. Advantages
Selecting voters randomly from the population of citizens of the member countries
belonging to an international organization has several important advantages over
other ways of approaching the issue.
Democratic control by the citizens is strengthened. The democracy deficit now
characterizing international organizations is overcome by giving citizens direct
participation rights. This enables them not only to react to what the management of
the international organizations proposes, but also to exert agenda setting power.17
Initiatives and referendums are an effective means of controlling the management
of international organizations. This power can be exercised by the citizens directly,
but also indirectly by non-governmental organizations and spontaneously arising
groups. They gain institutionalized access via the trustees to make their demands
known. To a lesser extent, they are induced, to go out on the streets and
demonstrate, or even forced to resort to violent action. Moreover, these non-state
actors, who claim to speak on behalf of the people, have to convince the trustees
that they are campaigning for a good cause, and that they do more than pursue their
own self-interest.
Legitimacy. The democratization of international organizations gives them a measure
of general acceptance which otherwise cannot be attained. The citizens of the member
countries, aware that they are fairly represented in the organizations’ decision-making
process, are motivated to provide international public goods, or at least to politically
support their provision. An example would be international agencies for the
improvement of global environmental goods (such as combating global warming),
which are today essentially technocratic units without much, or any, democratic basis.
They act far removed from the citizens. In a system of randomly selected voters
connected to such organizations, the citizens in the various member countries start to
feel an incentive and obligation to participate in the joint effort. An important route is
the general discussion generated among the citizens, whether they are selected or
not.18 On the one hand, the citizens are informed by NGOs (mostly via the mass
media, in particular TV and radio). On the other hand, the citizens have an incentive
to involve their trustees in discussions about the issues to be decided by the respective
international organization. The public discourse from the grass roots level, as well as
from specialists, serves to strengthen the willingness to participate in the provision of
international public goods.19 Decisions on international agreements taken by the
18 For the role of political discourse in multilateral organizations, see Verweij and Josling (2003).
17 The crucial importance of agenda setting is discussed in McKelvey (1976) and Romer and
Rosenthal (1978).
19 See the experimental results with public goods games, demonstrating that pre-play communica-
tion, and even identification of the persons involved, raises the willingness to contribute to the
provision of public goods considerably. See Bohnet and Frey (1999) and the extensive survey by
Sally (1995). A cross-section econometric analysis for Swiss cantons suggests that the more extensive
the citizens_ direct participation rights are, the higher tax morale is, and therefore the lower tax
evasion is (Pommerehne and Weck, 1996; Frey, 1997a). See also Torgler (2003).
Rev Int Org (2006) 1: 27–43 37
Springer
citizenry gain substantial legitimacy. It becomes costly for single governments of
member countries to step back due to short-term interests, although no direct
enforcement of the agreements is possible. Not sticking to these agreements cannot
easily be justiﬁed by too high costs for the population, if a majority of selected citizens
actually approved them.
Decentralized information. Another important advantage of direct participation
rights by trustees is their gathering of information from lower levels. This information
is less ﬁltered and distorted than that coming from the organization’s bureaucracy,
which tends to be biased by the self-interest of the executives and the other employees.
4.2. Possible Disadvantages
All social decision-making systems have some weaknesses; there is no such thing as
an ideal system. This also holds for the random selection of citizens, who have
extended democratic participation rights in international organizations. But, as will
be argued, many of these shortcomings are not as serious as they initially appear to
be.
Trustees’ capacities. It may be thought that the randomly selected trustees do not
have the necessary skills to make decisions concerning an international organ-
ization_s business in a reasonable and effective way. By definition, the selected
citizens only have average education and may therefore be perceived to be ill
prepared for the task. This argument goes to the roots of political decision-making.
Democracy is based on the principle that the citizens, on average, are capable of
making political decisions in a reasonable way. They have one great advantage over
professional politicians and bureaucrats: they know their own preferences better and
are therefore able to express them better politically. Moreover, there is the
fundamental principal-agent problem in politics: the professional politicians should
act in the interests of their principals, the citizens, but they only have limited
incentives to do so. In a representative democracy, the professional politicians are
responsive to the citizens’ preferences, especially at election time. Empirical
evidence demonstrates that, at other times, the actions undertaken by the
professional politicians deviate substantially from the citizens’ wishes.20 In the
extreme, the politicians Bexploit’’ the voters by pursuing policies according to their
personal or party ideologies, follow the interests of well-organized and financially
well-endowed pressure groups, or decide in their own favor (see Brennan and
Buchanan, 1980, 1985). For instance, they accord themselves special privileges (e.g.,
immunity from laws) or material benefits (such as generous compensations and
pensions, sumptuous expense accounts, cars and planes at their free disposal). With
direct participation rights of the citizens, these problems arise to a much lesser
extent. Econometric studies show that citizens can make well-reasoned political
decisions. Indeed, the more extensive citizens_ direct participation rights are, the
better is the public economy run. For instance, the relationship between public
expenditures and revenue is better controlled, so that the public debt per head is
20 See, e.g., the evidence on political business cycles in Frey (1997c) and Mueller (2003, part IV).
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lower. It has also been shown that per capita income is higher because the public
sector is better run, and that even self-reported subjective well-being is higher.21
Lack of information. A related argument claims that randomly selected citizens are
not well enough informed and are therefore at the mercy of bureaucrats. First of all, it
must be said that the same applies even to professional politicians; the public ofﬁcials
always have more information at their disposal, because they have often been in
charge of particular issues for a much longer period of time. It should also be noted
that randomly selected citizens are expected to rise to the challenge and can collect the
information necessary for making reasoned decisions. Such information need not be
very detailed: what matters are the fundamental issues to be decided on. Citizens need
to be able to draw on the knowledge of experts, whose job it is to provide detailed
information. Moreover, empirical evidence shows that it would be a mistake to take
the present level of information about the issues related to international organizations
as given. Rather, the amount of information consumed is endogenously determined
and is higher when citizens have more extensive political rights (Benz and Stutzer,
2004). It can thus be expected that the randomly chosen citizens are capable and
willing to learn the information necessary to perform their task adequately.
Inadequate incentives. It may also be argued that the trustees are not really motivated
to participate in the international organization’s decision making. However, a high
participation rate should not be taken as a value in itself. What matters is that the
selected citizens participate in the initiatives, referendums and recalls when important
issues are at stake. Such behavior provides clear signals to the international
organizations’ management that they are effectively controlled by the citizens and
cannot simply do what is in their own interests. Most people will consider it an honor
to be selected as a citizen with actual voting rights to an international organization,
and will therefore have an incentive to participate.
Misperceived fairness. The citizens may perceive the random selection of trustees as
unfair and therefore tend to reject it. In the private realm, there is indeed considerable
resistance to random decisions. Several studies analyzed the allocation of scarce
private goods in situations of excess demand. In a survey among the population, the
use of a random decision mechanism has been considered to be less fair than
alternative social decision-making mechanism such as Bﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served,’’ an
allocation by the commune, or even than the use of the price system (Frey and
Pommerehne, 1993, see also Wortman and Rabinowitz, 1979; Erez, 1985). Such
resistance where rationing is concerned certainly has to be taken into account. In the
public sphere, potential resistance can probably be overcome by showing the citizens
the advantages of random selection, in particular the guarantee that every citizen is
treated equally. People can also be informed that random systems are used, and
generally accepted, in many areas relating to their personal lives as, for instance, in
the hugely popular national lotteries, where the mechanism used is extensively shown
at prime TV time.
21 See Kirchgaessner et al. (1999) and Frey and Stutzer (2000), as well as the literature mentioned in
footnote 14.
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Missing democratic tradition. An organization’s member countries may have little or
no experience with democracy. While the random mechanism can probably be
controlled from outside, this is less likely to be the case for the underlying list of the
electorate, and the communication of who has been selected. But, most importantly,
the selected citizens in such a country will be induced, or forced directly, to follow the
will of the country’s government. This is unfortunate, but our proposal does not claim
to be able to transform non-democratic governments into democratic governments.
If, indeed, the citizens are forced to act as government pawns, the situation is no
worse than today, where the delegates of international organizations are directly
selected by the respective non-democratic governments. However, the random
selection of trustees may even give them a measure of independence with respect to
their own government, not least because they decide jointly with selected citizens in
democratic countries. Such joint experiences may (under the most favorable
conditions) even initiate a step towards democratization (Sen, 1999).
Exploitative decisions. Giving the citizens in the member countries participation
rights may be seen as opening the door to the majority of the poorer members being
able to exploit the minority of the richer members. Of course, the possibility already
exists under present conditions that the delegates of the poorer nations may ﬁnd a
majority to burden the richer member states. However, such proposals are unlikely to
be successful. To some extent, the double majority required to effect a corresponding
change in the constitution prevents the adoption of such proposals. The trustees in the
various countries would be alerted to the fact that such a constitutional change would
provoke the countries concerned and would provide reasons for leaving the respective
international organization. It is therefore in the self-interest of the trustees to be
careful in this respect.
5. Conclusions
International organizations perform important and indispensable roles in our world
today, taking over allocative, redistributive and stabilizing functions. However, the
existing international organizations are characterized by a fundamental democracy
deficit and lack democratic legitimacy. We propose institutional measures to
increase the direct participation possibilities of the citizens of an international
organization_s member countries. Due to the sheer number of citizens involved, it is
not feasible to let all of them decide on every single constitutional question. Rather,
trustees should be selected by a random mechanism. This guarantees that the
electorate is represented in a totally fair way. The trustees are given the right to start
initiatives and to vote in referendums on issues related to an international
organization’s constitution. They can also recall executives when they are
dissatisfied with their behavior. The random mechanism suggested for selecting
the trustees is indeed unusual. However, its potential in constitutional design is
supported by scientific research, as well as by historical examples.
In order to show the practicality of the proposed democratization of international
organizations, the various elements are specified, such as the number of citizens to
be chosen as trustees, and the number of years elected. These specifications are only
one example; they can and should vary from one international organization to
another. An important requirement proposed is that of a double majority: in order
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to change or amend an international organization’s constitution, there must be a
majority among all the trustees participating, as well as a majority of member
countries approving a proposal.
The construction of the international organizations existing today, especially in
their executive function, remains initially unaffected. The citizens’ participation
rights via their trustees do not substitute for these functions. The major difference to
existing constitutions is that the trustees have the final say. The executives of
international organizations must obey the constitutional changes adopted by the
trustees. The power given to the randomly selected trustees can be expected to have
a significant effect on the behavior of the agents in international organizations. The
executives would be subject to the control of the citizens of the member states. This
would induce both a higher responsiveness to the preferences of the people and
greater efficiency. Moreover, they would be given democratic legitimacy, which
would improve citizenship behavior.
We are well aware of the fact that our proposal is not ideal, and that many
counterarguments may be raised. But we have also argued that many points of
criticism are due to lack of familiarity with institutions of direct democracy. Based
on the experience with the working of initiatives, referendums and recall, many of
the counterarguments can be shown to be doubtful, if not actually wrong. There are,
of course, practical differences in the use of these instruments on an international
level. However, we do not think that the comparative arguments in favor of them
are reversed in international politics. The idea of giving citizens a direct say with
respect to international organizations could well pave the way towards a global civil
society.
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